WITHDRAWAL OF PRE-ACTION ADMISSIONS – JUDGES SHOULD RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO CONDUCT A MINI-TRIAL
Zenith'sBronia Hartley writes:Newham London Borough Council v Arboleda-Quiceno QBD(Lambert J) 31/07/2019The defendant local auth...
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Ruwena Khan
COSTS ORDERS, DISCONTINUANCE AND CPR r.38.6(1): Barker and Barker v Barnett (2015) (QBD)
The court can depart from the usual rule in CPR r.38.6(1) that a Claimant who has discontinued their claim is liable for the costs which a Defendant has incurred and, alternatively, order that the Defendant pay a part of the Claimant’s costs.
The Facts
The appellants (‘As’) appealed against a costs order made in the respondent’s (‘R’) favour.
R had brought a right of way claim against the As, her neighbours. R had written pre-action letters to the As in an attempt to resolve the dispute, but did not receive a response. A claim was issued in 2013. In February 2014 she filed a notice of discontinuance. R successfully applied to set aside a costs order that she should pay the As’ costs in relation to the discontinued claim. The subsequent order required the As to pay R’s costs until the date of service of the defence, with there being no costs thereafter. The judge accepted R’s submission that he should depart from the usual rule because the As had failed to comply with pre-action correspondence.
The As submitted that there had been no good reason to depart from the general rule in CPR r.38.6(1).
CPR r.38.6(1)
“Unless the court orders otherwise, a claimant who discontinues is liable for the costs which a defendant against whom the claimant discontinues incurred on or before the date on which notice of discontinuance was served on the defendant.”
The editorial notes in the White Book 2015 confirm that generally a claimant who discontinues a claim must show some form of unreasonable conduct on the part of the defendant which provides a good reason for departing from the default rule that a claimant is liable for the defendant’s costs up to the date when notice of the discontinuance is served (Nelson’s Yard Management Co v Eziefula [2013] EWCA Civ 235 – failure by the defendant to respond to pre-action correspondence).
The Appeal
The judge had correctly identified the relevant law. He had been fully aware of the factual background. His task was to summarise. The As’ Solicitors had warned them that a costs order might be made against them because they had not replied to pre-action correspondence. The case had been brought to court as a consequence of the As failure to communicate. The judge had correctly had regard to the reasons for the discontinuance put forward by R and had been entitled to find that R’s case was not necessarily hopeless. A generous margin was given to a judge when exercising discretion such as that in r.38.6(1). The court would only interfere with that exercise when the judge in the lower court:
Nelson’s Yard was followed.
The appeal was dismissed.
The Principles which Apply on a r.38.6 Application
Lessons to Be Learned